Our Mystique paper

Mystique: Uncovering Information Leakage from Browser Extensions

@inproceedings{mystique_ccs18,
	author = {Chen, Quan and Kapravelos, Alexandros},
	title = {Mystique: Uncovering Information Leakage from Browser Extensions},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
	series = {CCS '18},
	year = {2018},
	isbn = {978-1-4503-5693-0},
	location = {Toronto, Canada},
	pages = {1687--1700},
	numpages = {14},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3243734.3243823},
	doi = {10.1145/3243734.3243823},
	acmid = {3243823},
	publisher = {ACM},
	keywords = {browser extensions, information flow, javascript, privacy, taint analysis},
}

About this web interface:

This is the web interface for Mystique, our analysis system for detecting privacy abuses by Chrome/Opera extensions. Users can upload extensions to be analyzed by Mystique and get back the analysis results. Please contact the paper authors to obtain access.


Source code:

- [Upcoming] Taint implementation for Chromium - stay tuned!

- [Upcoming] Scripts to reproduce our experiments in the paper - stay tuned!


Last updated on Oct. 16, 2018